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In this article we analyze firms investment incentives in liberalized electricity markets. Since 
electricity is economically non storable, it is optimal for firms to invest in a differentiated 
portfolio  of  technologies  in  order  to  serve  strongly  fluctuating  demand.  Prior  to  the 
Liberalization  of  electricity  markets,  for  regulated  monopolists,  optimal  investment  and 
pricing strategies haven been analyzed in the peak load pricing literature (compare Crew and 
Kleindorder  (1986)).  In  restructured  electricity  markets  regulated  monopolistic  generators 
have often been replaced by competing and potentially strategic firms. 
This article aims to respond to the changed reality and model investment decisions of strategic 
firms in those markets. We derive equilibrium investment for strategic firms and compare to 
the benchmark cases of perfect competition and monopoly outcomes. We find that strategic 
firms have an incentive to overinvest in base-load technologies but choose total capacities too 
low from a welfare point of view. By fitting the framework to a specific electricity market 
(Germany)  we  are  able  to  empirically  analyze  Investment  choices  of  strategic  firms,  and 
quantify the potential for market power and its impact on generation portfolios in restructured 
electricity markets in the long run. 
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In this article we analyze ¯rms investment incentives in liberalized electricity markets.
In those markets ¯rms choose to invest in di®erent types of power plants which allow
production of electricity at di®erent levels of marginal cost. Since electricity is not storable
at reasonable cost, it is optimal for ¯rms to invest in a di®erentiated portfolio of technologies
in order to serve strongly °uctuating demand.1 Prior to the liberalization of electricity
markets, regulated monopolists decided on optimal investment and pricing strategies. In
the course of liberalizing those markets in Europe and the US, which started in the 1990's,
regulated monopolistic generators have been transformed into competing, but potentially
strategically acting ¯rms. The present chapter aims to respond to the changed reality in
restructured electricity markets and model investment decisions of strategic ¯rms in those
markets.
For a single regulated ¯rm, optimal investment and pricing decisions have been thor-
oughly analyzed in the so called peak load pricing literature. All main ¯ndings are sum-
marized in Crew and Kleindorfer (1986), the ¯rst contributions date back to the seminal
work of Boiteux (1949) and Steiner (1956). That literature and all its extensions2 analyze
optimal investment and pricing decisions of a single ¯rm whose product is non-storable and
demand °uctuates over time. The classical framework allows to determine welfare maxi-
mizing investment in a single technology. This was subsequently extended to the case of
optimal investment in several technologies under the objective of either welfare, or pro¯t
maximization.3 The peak load pricing literature was thus perfectly suited (and widely used)
to model investment decisions in electricity markets prior to liberalization, where electricity
indeed was supplied by regulated monopolies.
Liberalization of electricity markets, which started in the 1990's throughout Europe,
has changed this picture dramatically. In many countries electricity generation has been
opened to competition and regulated monopolistic generators have been transformed into
competing ¯rms. Most interestingly, the results obtained in the peak load pricing literature
1Typical industry investment in electricity markets contains for example nuclear, lignite, coal, gas and
oil plants. Nuclear and lignite plants are expensive to build but produce at low cost and thus run most of
the time. Coal and especially gas and oil plants are less expensive to build, but produce more expensively.
They will produce only part of the time in order to serve higher demand and peaks. Compare ¯gure 1 for
an illustration of typical industry marginal cost in Germany, 2006.
2For the case of a pro¯t maximizing monopolist see for example Oren et al. (1985).
3In a so called second best approach this was further extended and allows to determine optimal invest-
ment choice, maximizing any weighted sum of pro¯t and welfare.
2Figure 1: Typical Industry Marginal cost of producing electricity in Germany, 2006.
for a single ¯rm under the objective of welfare maximization can easily be extended to the
case of perfectly competitive ¯rms in liberalized markets. In a recent contribution Joskow
and Tirole (2007) thoroughly discuss all those results in the light of perfectly competitive
restructured electricity markets. All the results obtained in the peak load pricing literature,
however, are not applicable in case ¯rms do not behave perfectly competitive, but interact
strategically when making their investment decisions.
Especially in Europe policy makers are seriously concerned by the exercise of market
power in the electricity sector, which has been extensively analyzed and documented for
the wholesale markets.4 Very little is known, if and how market power is exercised in those
markets in the long run, when ¯rms make their investment decisions. The results obtained
for the spot markets, however, give little reason to expect perfectly competitive behavior (of
the same ¯rms) in the long run. Strategic interaction of several ¯rms has thus to be taken
into account, if meaningful predictions regarding ¯rms investment incentives in liberalized
4A recent study presented by the European Commission (2007) entitled "Structure and Performance of
Six European Wholesale Electricity Markets in 2003, 2004 and 2005" detects considerable market power at
several spot markets, e.g. for Germany.
3electricity markets are to be made.
In the present article we thus extend the framework of investment in several technolo-
gies analyzed in the peak load pricing literature for a single ¯rm to the case of strategically
interacting ¯rms.5 In a two stage market game ¯rms ¯rst make their investment decisions
prior to the spot market which is subject to uncertain or °uctuating demand, then ¯rms
compete at the spot market. Firms can decide to invest in many di®erent available tech-
nologies, which all di®er in their cost of investment and corresponding cost of production.
Firms investment decisions thus determines the precise composition of industry investment
in all technologies. That is, we obtain the precise shape of industry marginal cost function.6
Our main results can be summarized as follows: Most importantly we derive equilibrium
investment of strategic ¯rms, establishing existence and uniqueness.7 We then compare
equilibrium investment choice to the benchmark cases of perfect competition (welfare max-
imization), monopoly (pro¯t maximization) and the so called second best solution8 derived
in the peak load pricing literature. Interestingly, under imperfect competition ¯rms have
a strong incentive to invest into low marginal cost technologies in order to negatively in-
°uence their competitors' spot market outputs. We are able to establish properties under
which this strategic e®ect is so intense that equilibrium investment in low{marginal{cost
technologies in oligopoly is even above the welfare optimal level.
Based on the theoretical framework developed we then empirically analyze equilibrium
investment for the German electricity market. As a main result we ¯nd that investment of
strategic ¯rms9 in base{load technologies (producing at marginal cost below 25 €/MWh,
such as nuclear and lignite plants) exceeds ¯rst best investment levels. Strategic under{
investment takes place exclusively in middle{ and peak{load technologies (such as gas, or
5Notice that strategic investment in a single technology, i.e. capacity choice of strategic ¯rms, already
has received attention in the literature. See for example Murphy and Smeers (2005) or Grimm Zoettl
(2007) for the case of capacity choice prior to Cournot competition. For case of capacity choice prior to
price setting at the spot market , as analyzed by Fehr (1997), Reynolds and Wilson (2000) and recently
Fabra and Fructos (2007), it has been shown that symmetric pure strategy equilibria typically cannot exist.
6How those look like is illustrated in ¯gure 1 for the case of Germany.
7Fehr (1997) analyzes the case of strategic investment in several technologies prior to a spot market of
inelastic demand with price setting duopolists. He shows that typically symmetric investment-equilibria in
pure strategies cannot exist in such a setting.
8This second best approach maximized a weighted sum of welfare and pro¯ts.
9The German market consists essentially of four large players. Two of them (RWE and E.on) have a
market share of 26 % each, while the two smaller ones (ENBW and Vattenfall) together cover 30 % of the
market each. Compare, e.g., Monopolkommission (2007).
4oil-¯red plants). We are furthermore able to determine the impact of strategic behavior on
the entire distribution of wholesale prices in the long run.10 This allows to quantify the
potential for the exercise of market power in the German Electricity market, in the long
run, when ¯rms investment decisions are taken into account.
The article is structured as follows: In section 2 the framework is introduced. In sections
3 and 4 we derive the benchmark cases of perfect competition and monopoly. In section 5 we
analyze the case of imperfect competition, and compare them to the benchmark scenarios
(section 6). In section 7 empirically analyze investment decisions in the German electricity
market for all di®erent market structures. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyze a two stage market game where ¯rms choose cost functions under demand
uncertainty and make output choices after market conditions unraveled.
Industry demand is subject to random variations. Denote by µ ¸ 0 the range of possible
demand scenarios and by F(µ) the probability distribution over those demand scenarios,
with the corresponding density f(µ) = Fµ(µ).11 Market demand in scenario µ is given by12
P(Q;µ) = µ¡B(Q), without loss of generality we assume B(0) = 0. Whenever P(Q;µ) > 0
the following assumptions are satis¯ed:
Assumption 1 (Demand) .
(i) P(Q;µ) is twice continuously di®erentiable in Q with Pq(Q;µ) < 0
(ii) Pq(Q) + Pqq(Q)Q < 0.
Prior to unraveling of uncertainty, ¯rms decide on the technologies they want to install.
Each unit of a technology c allows for production of one unit at marginal cost c 2 R+
and comes at marginal cost of investment denoted by k(c). The Technologies available for
investment satisfy the following properties:
10Remember for the case of capacity choice in part I of the thesis, assessment of the distribution of
electricity prices was possible only for the upper tail (10%) of the price distribution. In part II we are now
able to derive the entire price distribution.
11Throughout the article we denote the derivative of a function g(x;y) with respect to an argument
z, z = x;y, by gz(x;y), the second derivative with respect to that argument by gzz(x;y), and the cross
derivative by gxy(x;y).
12For the case of linear demand we obtain B(Q) = b ¤ Q, with b being a positive constant.
5Assumption 2 (Technology) Each technology is characterized by its constant marginal
cost of production denoted by c. Per unit cost of investment in technology c is denoted by
k(c), which satis¯es:
(i) No technology comes for free, i.e. k(c) > 0 8c. 13 A technology which produces at zero
marginal cost is not available, i.e. k(0) = 1.
(ii) less e±cient technologies (that is technologies with higher c) are less expensive,
i.e. kc(c) < 0 8c.14
(iii) k(c) is su±ciently convex, i.e.
kcc(c) > f(c) and kcc(c) > f(F
¡1(kc(c) + 1)) 8c: (1)
The situation we want to analyze is captured by the following two stage situation.
At stage one ¯rms determine their technology mix by choosing their investment function
xi(c), we denote by x(c) = x1(c);:::;xn(c) the vector of all investment choices and by
X(c) =
Pn
j=1 xj(c) the industry investment. As illustrated in ¯gure 2, the investment
choice xi(c) of ¯rm i determines which output can be produced at Marginal cost c.15
At the second stage ¯rms choose their output at the spot market after having observed
both the investment choices of all ¯rms and the realization of demand. We denote by
q(µ) = (q1(x;µ);:::;qn(x;µ)) the vector of outputs of the n ¯rms in scenario µ, and let
Q(x;µ) =
Pn
i=1 qi(µ) be total quantity produced in the market.
In the following we now determine pro¯ts of ¯rm i for ¯xed cumulative investment x(c),
and given Spot market outputs q(x;µ). In the subsequent sections we will be more speci¯c
on the precise characterization of Spot market competition, which will be given by perfect
competition, monopoly and Cournot-Competition. For the framework chosen, Spot market
outcomes are always nondecreasing in µ. We can thus characterize the demand realization
µc
i which will give rise to production cost c:
µ
c
i(x;q) = f(µ;c) : qi(x;µ) = xi(c)g
13This assumption is not crucial, whenever k(c) = 0 for some c < c, then we would just obtain a corner
solution, where capacity could be in¯nite at that technology. For ease of exposition we exclude this corner
solution
14This is a natural observation which can already be found in the pioneering contributions on peak load
pricing, compare Boiteux (1948).
15In a sense it is just the inverse of the marginal cost function, however since ¯rms choose their investment
in di®erent technologies it is much more convenient to choose this formulation.
6Figure 2: Investment decision xi(c) of ¯rm i.
i.e. for given (qi(x;µ);xi(c)), if µ
c0
i occurs, then ¯rm i will produce at marginal cost c0.
Furthermore for all µ < µ
c0
i ¯rm i will produce at marginal cost below c0 and for all µ > µ
c0
i
¯rm i will produce at marginal cost above c0. This is illustrated in ¯gure 2.
In order to determine total pro¯ts of ¯rm i associated to some investment choice xi(c),
we ¯rst determine pro¯ts associated to some partial investment dxi(c0) as illustrated in
¯gure 2. That is we determine pro¯ts generated by technology c0, the amount invested in
this technology is given by dxi(c0). Observe that such investment will only yield positive
revenues for demand realizations µ > µ
c0
i . Expected revenues generated by dx(c0) are given
by the expected markup in all those demand realizations where indeed production is at or





[P (Q(x;µ);µ) ¡ c0]dF(µ) ¤ dxi(c0)
On the other hand, the cost of investment in technologies dxi(c0) is given by the (constant)
marginal cost k(c0) of investment times the amount times the amount dx(c0) invested:
k(c0) ¤ dxi(c0)
In the context of electricity generation, the above analysis corresponds to determining
expected pro¯ts generated by a small power plant of size dxi(c0) which produces at marginal
cost c0 and comes at a cost of investment given by k(c0).
7In order to obtain total pro¯ts associated to the entire investment-choice xi(c), we need
to sum up for all technologies, where investment took place. Suppose ¯rm i did choose


































([P(Q;µ) ¡ ci]xi)dF(µ) ¡ k(ci)xi (2)
The ¯rst summand of (2) yields pro¯ts of interior investment xi < xi(ci) and the second
summand yields pro¯ts of investment at the capacity bound xi = xi(ci).
We now analyze the impact of a variation of the investment function xi(c) on ¯rm
i's total pro¯ts. We have to take into account two di®erent types of such variations as
illustrated in ¯gure 3.
Figure 3: Changes of Investment xi(c), interior case and boundary case.
First we consider interior cases, where investment is changed by some amount dx(c0;c00)
for all technologies c 2 [c0;c00], with c0 < c00 · ci. Such variation is denoted by
d¼i(¢)
dx(c0;c00) and is
given by expression (3) of lemma 1. Second we consider variations of the overall capacity xi
8by the amount dx(ci), changing investment for all technologies above the highest technology
c ¸ ci. Such variation is denoted by
d¼i(¢)
dx(ci) and is given by expression (4) of lemma 1.
When computing those ¯rst derivatives it is important to notice that the spot market
equilibrium Q(x;µ) depends on ¯rms investment choices. Thus both the critical demand
realizations and the realized market prices will change as investment xi(c) of ¯rm i is
modi¯ed.
Lemma 1 (First Derivative { General Case) .
(i) Interior Case: Consider a variation of investment xi(c), a®ecting all technologies






















(ii) Boundary case: Consider a variation of investment xi(c), a®ecting all technologies












dF(µ) ¡ k(ci) (4)
Proof see Appendix 8. ¤
Lemma 1 gives the impact of a variation of ¯rm i's investment on it's pro¯ts both for
the interior and for the boundary case16. The analysis up to now does not yet specify the
type of (strategic) behavior of ¯rms both at the spot markets and the investment stage. In
order to solve for the cases of Perfect competition, Monopoly and of strategic interaction in
the subsequent section, these ¯rst derivatives of lemma 1 provide a valuable starting point.
3 Perfect Competition { Welfare Maximization
As a Benchmark we determine the case of perfectly competitive behavior both at the
spot markets and the investment stage. 17 In our framework, for the case of perfect
16A change in total investment by dx which a®ects all c ¸ c0 can be determined by setting c00 = ci and
just summing then over (3) and (4).
17This has already been analyzed in the peak load pricing literature, the ¯rst best solution of our frame-
work, however, will serve as a valuable benchmark in order to compare to the case of strategic interaction
of ¯rms as analyzed in section 5. Furthermore in the framework chosen, we obtain a smooth solution, which
makes its characterization as given in theorem 1 rather short, in contrast to previous contributions on that
topic.
9competition, only industry investment X(c) =
Pn
j=1 xj(c) and industry output Q(µ) =
Pn
j=1 qj(µ) matter. In order to compare later on to the case of strategic behavior, however,
we will explicitly consider n ¯rms which equally share investment and output among each
other.
The perfectly competitive spot market outcome for ¯xed industry investment X(c) and
¯xed realization of uncertainty µ ¸ 0 is given by the well known condition of "price =
marginal cost", i.e. P(X(c);µ) = c 8µ. As in the previous section for the general case, we
now de¯ne the critical demand realization µc
FB which makes ¯rms produce at marginal cost
c. We obtain for µc
FB and the corresponding spot-market output QFB(µ):
µ
c
FB = c + B(X(c)) 8c (5)
Q
FB(µ) = f(Q;µ) : (Q = X(c);µ = µ
c
FB 8c)g
Having speci¯ed the outcomes at the spot market under perfect competition for given
investment choice, we can now turn towards solving for equilibrium investment choice at
stage one. We already have derived general ¯rst order conditions in lemma 1. It now
remains to adapt those conditions for the case of perfect competition and to verify their
su±ciency, as summarized in lemma 2.
Expressions (6) and (7) of lemma 2 can be directly derived from expressions (3) and
(4), since the last summand of it's integrands equals zero. This is due to the following two
observations: ¯rst under perfect competition ¯rms take the market price as given i.e.
dP(¢)
dx =
0 and second, by de¯nition of µc
FB as established above in (5), we have P(Q(µc
FB);µc
FB) = c.
We obtain the following equilibrium conditions under perfect competition:
Lemma 2 (Optimality Conditions, Perfect competition) .
(i) First order conditions:







FB) + kc(c)) dc = 0: (6)










¡ c dF (µ) ¡ k(c) = 0: (7)
10(ii) Second order conditions:
The cross derivatives with respect to di®erent technologies equal zero, i.e.
d2¼i(x;qFB)
dx(c1;c2)dx(c0;c00) = 0 (for c1 < c2 < c0 < c00) and
d2¼i(x;qFB)
dx(c0;c00)dx(ci)=0.
The second derivatives with respect to the same technologies are always negative, i.e.
d2¼i(x;qFB)
d(x(c0;c00))




Computation of the second derivatives is relegated to appendix 8. A crucial property of
the way the problem of investment in the optimal technology mix is presented throughout
this article lies in the simplicity of the second order conditions, namely the cross derivatives
with respect to di®erent technologies always equal to zero. This is due to the fact, that
the pro¯tability of changing investment xi(c) for some technologies c 2 [c0;c00] is the same
for all di®erent investment functions which coincide for the technologies c 2 [c0;c00] under
consideration but exhibit completely di®erent values at other technologies. Optimality of
investment xi(c0) at some technology c0 can thus be determined independently from the
shape of the remaining function.
Let us now brie°y provide some economic intuition for the ¯rst order conditions as given
in lemma 2. First notice that variation of investment xi(c) for c 2 [c0;c00] as illustrated in
¯gure 3 can be interpreted as substituting technology c00 by technology c0 (in the case of
dx(c0;c00) > 0, the reverse for dx(c0;c00) > 0).
The impact of such variation will reduce expected production cost on the one hand,
it will increase however the investment cost of ¯rm i. More speci¯cally this implies that
¯rms when choosing their optimal technology{mix face the following tradeo®: The extra
revenues from such substitution in the case of perfect competition are given by the savings
in production cost (c00 ¡ c0), which occur with probability (1 ¡ F(µc
FB)) and are given by
R c00
c0 (1 ¡ F(µc
FB))dc. The extra expenditures of such variation on the other hand are given
by the extra investment cost
R c00
c0 kc(c)dc = k(c00) ¡ k(c0) < 0.
Thus whenever 1 ¡ F(µc
FB) + kc(c) > 0 ¯rms want to increase investment in the more
e±cient technology c0 by substitution with the less e±cient technology c00. For the converse,
1¡F(µc
FB)+kc(c) < 0 ¯rms want to invest less in the more e±cient technology c0 by reducing
in c00.
We now denote by c¤ that technology where ¯rms just start to invest and denote by µ
¤ =
c¤ that demand realization where ¯rms start to produce for given investment. 18 Investment
below c¤ cannot be pro¯table, this lower bound is characterized by 1 ¡ F(c¤) + kc(c¤) = 0,
see lemma 3 (i).
18i.e. X(c)=0, for c · c¤ and ¯rms do not produce for µ · µ¤ for given investment.
11For c > c¤, the optimal technology mix then satis¯es 1 ¡ F(µc
FB) + kc(c) = 0 for all
technologies c 2 [c¤;c¤]. Notice however that this interior ¯rst order condition is only a
relative statement, establishing the optimal mix of technology choice. It still leaves the
question of absolute capacity choice, untouched. This is tackled in expression (7) of lemma
2, the ¯rst order condition for a capacity change. It pins down the trade o® a ¯rm faces at
the capacity bound, where the right hand side is just marginal welfare at the spot market
from additional investment in technology c while the left hand side is marginal cost of
investment.The overall capacity choice X and the corresponding boundary technology c¤
consequently have to satisfy both the interior ¯rst order condition (6) and the boundary
condition (7). In lemma 3 we now characterize the set of active technologies [c¤;c¤]:
Lemma 3 (Active Technologies) If investment in some technologies is pro¯table, i.e.
R µ
c (µ ¡ c)dF(µ) > k(c) for some c ¸ 0, then ¯rms will invest in the technologies c 2 [c¤;c¤].
(i) Lower Bound (c¤): The lowest technology for which investment is pro¯table c¤ is
uniquely characterized by: 1 ¡ F(c¤) + kc(c¤) = 0. The demand realization for which
¯rms start to produce is given by µ
¤ = c¤:
(ii) Upper Bound (c¤): The highest technology for which investment is pro¯table c¤,















Proof See appendix 8 ¤
In theorem 1 we put all these results together characterizing Industry investment X¤
FB(c)
which obtains under perfect competition:
Theorem 1 (Competitive Solution) Under perfect competition the industry invest-
ment function X¤







0 c < c¤
(X;c) : fP (X;µc











The critical demand realization µc
FB for the interior solution solves 1¡F(µc
FB)+kc(c) = 0.




12For an illustration of industry investment obtained under perfect competition compare
¯gure 4.
The entire analysis was conducted under the hypothesis, that all technologies c 2 [c¤;c¤]
are part of a solution, i.e. that the solution X¤







FB(c))(¡Pq) > 0 due to assumption 2(iii), there k(c) is assumed to be convex
enough, which ensures that at the solution all technologies c 2 [c¤;c¤] indeed are active.
At this point it is important to point out that the analysis of the ¯rst best case has
already been dealt with extensively in the peak load pricing literature. However, that
literature focuses on discrete instead of continuous technology choices. Here, we (re{)solve
the ¯rst best case within our continuous model since it later serves as a benchmark for the
case of imperfect competition, which is the main focus of our analysis. It is still worthwhile
to mention, however, that the framework of continuous technology sets not only seems
to make it easier to gather some intuition, but also crucially simpli¯es the mathematical
exposition of the results.19
4 Pro¯t Maximization { Monopoly Outcome
Next we consider the case that where ¯rms' total pro¯ts are maximized, i.e. the case
of monopoly (or collusion in case several ¯rms are active in the market). The solution
is obtained analogously to the solution of the ¯rst best case. Under ¯rms joint Pro¯t
maximization again only industry investment X(c) =
Pn
j=1 xj(c) and industry output Q(µ)
matter. In order to compare to the case of strategic behavior of ¯rms in section 5, we
explicitly n ¯rms which equally share investment and output.
The pro¯t maximizing Spot{market solution for given investment X0(c) at each demand
realization µ solves the standard condition of "Marginal Revenue equals marginal cost", i.e.
P(X(c);µ) + Pq(X(c))X(c) = c 8µ. Again we de¯ne the critical demand realization µc
M,
which makes ¯rm produce at marginal cost given they have invested X0(c) and maximize
pro¯ts at the spot market. The critical demand realization and the corresponding spot-
19Just to give an example: In their more than 50 page survey on the theory on peak load pricing in
Crew and Kleindorfer (1986) exact characterizations of quantities invested and exact production of each
technology is omitted: "While the lemma indicates which plants are used it does not indicate the amounts
of capacity ql and amounts produced by each plant in each period qli. To derive this is complicated and
calls for a lengthy theorem which we do not state here (see Crew and Kleindorfer 1979a, pp-42{50, 63-65).",
see Crew and Kleindorfer (1986), p 45.
13market output QM(µ) are given by:
µ
c
M = B(X(c)) ¡ Pq(X(c))X(c) + c 8c; (10)
Q
M(µ) = f(Q;µ) : fQ = X(c);µ = µ
c
M 8cgg: (11)
Having speci¯ed the outcomes at the spot markets under pro¯t maximization for given
investment choice, we can now turn towards solving for optimal investment choice at stage
one. Again relying on the general ¯rst order conditions derived in lemma 1, we can directly
deduce the ¯rst order conditions under pro¯t maximization as summarized in lemma 4.
Expression (12) is directly obtained from (3) since it's last integrand equals zero for
the case of pro¯t maximization. This is due to the following two observations: ¯rst
dP(QM;µ)
dx(c0;c00) xi(c) = Pq(¢)
dQM(µ)
dxc0;c00 xi(c) = PqX(c), and second by the de¯nition of µc
M as estab-
lished in (10), we have P(Q(µc
M);µc
M) ¡ c + Pq(Q(µc
M))X(x) = 0. We obtain the following
optimality conditions under pro¯t maximization:
Lemma 4 (Optimality Conditions, Profit Maximization) .
(i) First order conditions:







M) + kc(c)) dc = 0: (12)















X ¡ c dF (µ) ¡ k(c) = 0: (13)
(ii) Second order conditions:
The cross derivatives with respect to di®erent technologies equal zero, i.e.
d2¼i(x;qM)
dx(c1;c2)dx(c0;c00)=0 for (c1 < c2 < c0 < c00) and
d2¼i(x;qM)
dx(c0;c00)dx(ci)=0.
The second derivatives with respect to the same technologies are always negative, i.e.
d2¼i(x;qM)
d(x(c0;c00))




Computation of the second order conditions is relegated to appendix 8.
Those ¯rst order conditions look very similar to the case of perfect competition as
obtained in the last section. Most notably the locus of the critical demand realizations,
14making ¯rms produce at some level of marginal cost c, µc¤
M is identical to the case of perfect
competition since it is also given as the solution to 1¡F(µC¤
m )+kc(c) = 0, in the following we
will thus keep the notation µc¤
FB. Thus under pro¯t maximization ¯rms will choose to invest
into the same active set of technologies c 2 [c¤;c¤] which has already been characterized
in lemma 3 for the case of perfect competition. When backing out Industry investment
X¤
M which gives rise to those critical demand realizations, we observe di®erent investment
behavior, ¯rms will invest less than under perfect competition.
For the boundary case on the other hand, the ¯rst order condition pins down the trade
o® ¯rms faces at the capacity bound. The left hand side is marginal revenues at the spot
market from additional investment in technology c0 while the right hand side is marginal
cost of investment.
The following theorem 2 provides a full characterization of ¯rms' investment decision
X¤
M(c) under joint pro¯t maximization.
Theorem 2 (Monopoly Solution) Under pro¯t maximization the industry investment
function X¤







0 c < c¤
(X;c) : fP (X;µc















The critical demand realization µc
FB for the interior solution (c 2 [c¤;c¤]) is identically to
the First best case characterized by 1 ¡ F(µc





For an illustration compare ¯gure 4.
Remark 1 In the peak load pricing literature (see for example Crew and Kleindorfer
(1986), pp. 77{79), a so called \second best solution" is proposed, where welfare is max-
imized under a pro¯t constraint. The tightness of the pro¯t constraint can be expressed
through a shadow price denoted by £ ¸ 0 and normalization yields ¸ = £
1+£ 2 [0;1]. For
¸ 2 [0;1] all solutions lying within the two extreme points of welfare maximum and pro¯t
maximum can be obtained (see Crew and Kleindorfer (1986) expression (4.58) on p. 79).
As it turns out, within our approach of a continuous technology set all those solutions share
the same critical demand realizations µc
FB, which solve 1¡F(µc
FB)+kc(c) = 0; 8c 2 [c¤;c¤].
Firms investment x¸(c) = 1
nX¸(c) di®ers, however, depending on the tightness of the pro¯t







0 c < c¤
(X;c) : fP (X;µc















Notice that for ¸ = 0 (the case of welfare maximization) this statement replicates theorem1
and for ¸ = 1 (pro¯t maximization) it replicates theorem2. For an illustration compare
¯gure 4.
The concept of second best solutions allows thus to cover both the case of perfect
competition and the case of pro¯t maximization. It is important to emphasize however
that even for intermediate values 0 < ¸ < 1, the concept of second best solutions is not
capable of capturing strategic interaction of ¯rms which is the topic of the subsequent
section.
5 Strategic Firms { Imperfect Competition
Having reviewed the benchmark cases of welfare and pro¯t maximization in sections 3 and
4, we now turn towards the case of imperfect competition. We derive the equilibrium of
the two stage market game where ¯rms ¯rst decide on their investment xi(c) and then
after having observed investment decisions and realization of demand decide on production
qi(x;µ). Analogously to the previous analysis we ¯rst solve for the spot market equilibria
for given Investment decisions x0
i(c) for each demand realization µ.
Since marginal cost are nondecreasing (the capacity choice problem exhibits this prop-
erty by construction) and due to concavity of pro¯ts ensured by assumption 1 (ii), there
always exists a unique Cournot equilibrium at the spot market. Since ¯rms invest-
ment choices can be asymmetric, in that Cournot equilibrium for given demand realiza-
tion µ0 and given investment x0(c) ¯rms will produce at di®erent marginal cost. The
Cournot equilibrium at the spot market xi(c
EQ






n (µ). Those are characterized by of the following well{known


































We can now proceed analogously to the previous sections and characterize the critical
16demand realizations20 µc














i (µ) = xi(c
EQ
i (µ)) 8µ;i
It is worth-wile to notice that the critical demand realization µc
EQ;i of the Cournot spot





i = c , µ
c
EQ;i = B(QEQ) ¡ Pq(QEQ)q
EQ
i + c (17)
Where the right expression just makes use of the initial separability assumption of demand
which was assumed to be given by P(Q;µ) = µ ¡ B(Q).
Having solved for the outcomes at the spot market for ¯xed investment choice, we can
now proceed and solve for the overall equilibrium with respect to ¯rms investment choices.
Again we make use of the general ¯rst order conditions derived in lemma 1, and derive the
optimal capacity of ¯rm i for ¯xed investment X¡i(c) of all other ¯rms. The ¯rst order
conditions of ¯rm i for the case of strategic capacity choice are summarized in lemma 5.
Expression (18) is directly obtained from (3) This is due to the following two observa-
tions: ¯rst
dP(QEQ;µ)








xi(c), and second by the de¯nition of µc
EQ as
established in (16), we have P(QEQ(µc
EQ);µc
EQ) ¡ c + Pq(QEQ(µc
EQ))xi(c) = 0. Likewise we
obtain expression (19) from (4). We obtain the following optimality conditions for the case
of strategic interaction among ¯rms:
Lemma 5 (Optimality Conditions, Strategic Firms) .
(i) First order conditions:
















































20Remember: the critical demand realization is that demand realization µc
EQ;i that will give rise to





























dF (µ) ¡ k(ci) = 0 (19)
(ii) Second order conditions:
The cross derivatives with respect to di®erent technologies equal zero, i.e.
d2¼i(x;qM)
dx(c1;c2)dx(c0;c00)=0 for (c1 < c2 < c0 < c00) and
d2¼i(x;qM)
dx(c0;c00)dx(ci)=0.




2 < 0 and
d2¼i(x;qM)
d(x(ci))
2 < 0, if the following conditions are satis¯ed:
(a) Demand is linear, i.e. Pqq = 0,
(b) f00(µ) · 0 whenever f0(µ) > 0,
(c) x00
j(c) · 0 8c;j 6= i.
Proof see appendix 8. ¤
Also for the case of strategic interaction we observe ¯rst of all that again the second
order conditions have a very special and simple form: all cross derivatives equal to zero.
Again (for given investment decisions X¡i(c)) the pro¯tability of substituting investment
in technology c0 by investment in technology c00 is solely determined by the investment level
xi(c) forc 2 [c0;c00] but not by the investment decision in other technologies c < c0 or c > c00.
Veri¯cation of second order condition thus reduces to checking for negative second
derivatives with respect to the same technologies, i.e.
d2¼i(x;qM)
d(x(c0;c00))




The computations involved are relatively burdensome, and we restrict to the case of lin-
ear demand in order to maintain tractability of the problem (It seems however that there
are no major obstacles when extending the present analysis of second order conditions to
the nonlinear case). Furthermore in order to ensure concavity of the problem two further
assumptions are required: ¯rst the density of uncertainty should not increase too steeply
(condition (b)) and second the investment functions chosen by all rivals should become
°atter and °atter as the capacity bound xj is approached (condition (c)).
The ¯rst order conditions can be interpreted similar to the case of welfare or pro¯t
maximization as analyzed in sections 3 and 4. For the interior solution, ¯rms face the trade
o® of substituting investment in technology c0 by investment in technology c00. Again this
decision is driven by the mass above the critical demand realization versus the di®erence
in investment cost, i.e. 1 ¡ F(µc
EQ;i) + kc(c). Under Strategic interaction, however, ¯rms
also take into account the impact of their investment decision on the rivals spot market
18outputs Q¡i, since more aggressive cost functions will give a more advantageous position for
the spot market competition.In principle the same argument holds true for the boundary
case (again we observe the term
dQ¡i
dx(ci))), however since there exist only symmetric equilibria
of the overall game as we will show later on, the reaction of ¯rms output choice will be
irrelevant since ¯rms anyhow are capacity constrained for those demand realizations.
Most importantly it remains to notice that the ¯rst order conditions of ¯rm i do only
involve levels of investment choice xi(c), but not on it's slope x0
i(c). When checking for
potential deviations from a given equilibrium candidate with ¯xed investment X¡i(c), ¯rm i
faces a standard maximization problem can be solved by the point wise ¯rst order conditions
(pointwise, since all cross derivatives are zero). Derivation of entire equilibrium candidates
(e.g. symmetric candidate) on the other hand will involve the solution of a di®erential
equation. We thus restrict attention to di®erentiable21 equilibrium candidates x¤(c), but
allow deviations to non{di®erentiable investment functions x¤
i(c). We now provide a full
characterization of each ¯rm's investment choice x¤
EQ(c) under strategic interaction of ¯rms:
Theorem 3 (Strategic Behavior) There exists a unique equilibrium of the overall
game, if the second order conditions established in lemma 5 are satis¯ed22. Each ¯rm
chooses to invest x¤
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Proof Proof see appendix 8. ¤
21This ensures that
dQ¡i
dx(ci)) is well de¯ned. Similar restriction to di®erentiable functions are found in
many contributions of the literature, compare for example the article on supply function competition by
Klemperer and Meyer (1989).
22As stated in lemma 5, the second order conditions are always satis¯ed if conditions (a), (b) and (c) are
satis¯ed. Especially the assumption of linear demand was made mainly in order to limit the computational
burden when determining second order conditions. The symmetric candidate solution for the nonlinear
























¡ 1 ¡ kc(c)
´
with µc
EQ = c + B(nx) + Pqx
19For an illustration of industry investment obtained under strategic behavior, compare
¯gure 4. Most notably we obtain the same set of active technologies c 2 [c¤;c¤] (char-
acterized in lemma 3) as for the case under perfect competition and pro¯t maximization.
However as explained above, strategic ¯rms take into account their opponents reactions at
the spot markets when making their investment decisions. In the following section 6 we
provide a detailed discussion, comparing the solutions under imperfect competition to the
benchmark cases of welfare and pro¯t maximization.
6 Comparison of the Theoretical Results
In this section we discuss and compare the solutions obtained in sections 3, 4, and 5. That
is, we compare the two benchmark cases of welfare{ and pro¯t{maximization with the case
of imperfect competition. Theorems 1, 2, and 3 characterize industry investment X¤(c) for
for the di®erent market structures, they all rely on specifying the locus of critical demand
realizations µc. Remember, for given industry investment X0(c), the demand realization
µc
0(X0(c0)) was de¯ned such as to give rise to production at marginal cost c0 2 [c¤;c¤] at the
spot market. In equilibrium, industry investment X¤(c) relates to those critical demand
realizations µc by the well known optimality conditions for the di®erent types of spot market
competition.23 Both industry investment and corresponding critical demand realizations
for all scenarios analyzed are illustrated in ¯gure 4.
First notice that all solutions discussed in the peak load pricing literature (i.e. welfare{
and pro¯t{maximization, and all intermediate X¸{solutions discussed in remark 1) share
the same locus of critical demand realization24 µ¤
FB(c) for all c. In other words, for any given
technology c0, this technology will start to be operating at the very same demand realization
µ0 = µ
c0
FB, no matter if welfare or total pro¯ts or a weighted sum of both is maximized.
Industry investment X¤(c) relate to those critical demand realizations by the well known
optimality conditions for the di®erent types of spot market competition mentioned above.
Since all benchmark cases share the same critical demand realization (µc
FB), when comparing
them with each other, the usual well known arithmetic applies: The monopoly outcome lies
23For the case of Perfect competition those are given by "price equals marginal cost", i.e.
P(X¤
FB(c);µc










¸(c) = c 8c.
24Remember this is de¯ned by F(µ¤
FB(c))¡1¡kc(c) = 0 8c 2 [c¤;c¤]Compare theorem 1, theorem 2 and
Remark 1.
20Figure 4: Illustration of the Solutions: Industry investment X¤(c) and critical demand
realizations µc for the 4 scenarios analyzed.
below the perfectly competitive outcome All second best solutions lie between these two
solutions (proportionally according to ¸). This is illustrated in ¯gure 4.
The solution under imperfect competition turns out to be qualitatively di®erent. The
reason is that strategic ¯rms take into account that their rivals will reduce their spot
market production at the second stage in case they invest more heavily in low marginal
cost technologies at the ¯rst stage. As a result, the locus of the critical demand realizations
µc
EQ always lies above the corresponding locus of the critical demand realizations in the ¯rst
best solution as illustrated in ¯gure 4. In other words, for any given technology c0, this
technology will start to be operating at a lower demand realization in the First Best and the
monopoly case (and all intermediate \second best" solutions) than in the case of imperfect
competition (formally: µc
FB < µc
EQ for all c 2 [c¤;c¤]). This strategic e®ect is irrelevant,
however, when either (i) production is zero (for c · c¤), or (ii) ¯rms are capacity constrained
and do not react to modi¯ed cost functions of the rivals (i.e. for c ¸ c¤). In both cases the
critical demand realizations coincide (i.e. µc
FB = µc
EQ for c = fc¤;c¤g), for an illustration
again see ¯gure 4. Also for the case of strategic ¯rms, Industry investment X¤
EQ(c) relate to
the critical demand realizations µc
EQ by the standard equilibrium conditions of the Cournot
spot market competition25.





EQ(c) = c 8c.
21We can thus easily compare the case of imperfect competition to the monopoly outcome:
both, the usual spot market arithmetics and the locus of the critical demand realization
imply that the marginal cost function under imperfect competition will be chosen such that
strictly more output is produced at each given marginal cost c than in the case of monopoly.
(i.e. x¤
EQ(c) > x¤
M(c) 8c 2 [c¤;c¤]). This is illustrated in ¯gure 4. Finally notice that we
could replicate ¯rms' total capacity choice x¤ under imperfect competition by a \second
best" scenario (as analyzed in the peak load pricing literature) by the appropriate choice
of ¸. For the case of n ¯rms, ¸ = 1
n would yield the same total capacity choice as the
n{¯rm equilibrium. However, for technologies below the capacity bound. In equilibrium
¯rms invest strictly more into low marginal cost technologies than predicted by the ¸ = 1
n
approximation. Thus, even though the approximation would yield the same total capacity,
under imperfect competition ¯rms invest relatively more in low marginal cost technologies
than predicted. This is nicely illustrated in ¯gure 7 when comparing equilibrium investment
for the case of n = 2 and n = 4 ¯rms (i.e. X¤
EQ(n = 2) and X¤
EQ(n = 4)) with the







When it comes to compare the case of imperfect competition to the ¯rst best outcome,
clear cut solutions are obtained only for the total capacity choice. Recall that the critical
demand realizations for the First Best case and the case of imperfect competition coincide
at the upper bound c¤ (i.e. µEQ(c¤) = µFB(c¤). We can thus conclude that total capacity
invested under imperfect competition is strictly below total capacity in the First Best solu-
tion. For interior technologies below the capacity bound, however, this may turn around,
since the locus of the critical demand realization is above the benchmark case at each tech-
nology c. In the following lemma we provide a condition under which ¯rms invest more in
low marginal cost technologies under imperfect competition than in the First Best solution.
Lemma 6 (Over{investment in low marginal cost technologies) In the case
of imperfect competition ¯rms invest more in e±cient technologies (close to c¤) than in
the ¯rst best case if and only if kcc(c¤) >
2(n¡1)
n¡2 f(c¤).
Proof see appendix 8.
As we can see, for n = 2 ¯rms we will never observe overinvestment in low marginal
cost technologies under imperfect competition. For n ¸ 3 ¯rms, however, if the set of
technologies available on the market is su±ciently convex, overinvestment in low marginal
cost technologies occurs.26
26In the subsequent section 7 we apply our theoretical framework to the case of investment choice in
22We conclude this section by a discussion of the assumptions necessary in order to obtain
existence of the symmetric equilibrium for the case of imperfect competition. While the
assumption of linear demand does not seem to be essential in order to obtain our results,
other assumptions made on the nature of uncertainty (the distribution of µ) and the set of
available technologies k(c) are crucial. In particular we had to restrict the analysis to those
densities which do not exhibit upwards jumps, i.e. f00(µ) < 0 whenever f0(µ) > 0. The
reason is that if the distribution had high peaks, ¯rms could want to deviate by \jumping
on that peak" creating a situation where they are cheap and the others are relatively
expensive just for those values of µ that have a high mass. We furthermore had to choose the
framework such that equilibrium investment is a concave function (i.e. x¤00
EQ(c) < 0 for all c 2
(c¤;c¤)). The reason is that the reaction of the opponents to more aggressive cost functions
is driven by the steepness of their marginal cost functions. The steeper the marginal
cost function of the opponents, the smaller their reaction. Notice that the requirement
of concave equilibrium investment is closely related to continuity of the technology set
k(c). That is, if only a discrete set of technologies is available, the resulting investment
choice will be a step function which necessarily violates the above assumption. This implies
however that an analysis of equilibrium cost functions under imperfect competition in the
framework presented necessarily has to involve a continuous distribution of uncertainty
and continuous technology sets. This seems to parallel the ¯ndings on supply function
equilibria. In a seminal article Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show existence and uniqueness
of di®erentiable supply functions for a continuous distribution of demand uncertainty. Bolle
(1992) and Green and Newberry (1992) apply those ¯ndings in order to model ¯rms behavior
at electricity spot markets. In a subsequent contribution Fehr and Harbord (1994) show,
however, that those results do extend to a more realistic discrete setting. Nevertheless,
frameworks with smooth supply functions enjoy unchanged popularity when modeling ¯rms
behavior at electricity spot markets.
electricity generation. As illustrated in ¯gure 7, for the case of duopoly (X2
EQ) we do not observe over{
investment, whereas for the case of 4 strategic ¯rms (X2
EQ) the model predicts over{investment in e±cient
technologies.
237 Empirical Analysis for the German Electricity Mar-
ket
In this section we demonstrate how our theoretical insights can be used to assess ¯rms
investment decisions in electricity generation facilities in liberalized electricity markets.
Here, for the reason of data availability, we use data of the German electricity market.
Our aim is to ¯t the theoretical model as closely as possible to the data of the German
Electricity market for the year 2006 and to compute resulting industry investment choice for
the di®erent hypothesis of perfect competition, monopoly and strategic behavior of ¯rms.
In order to use our theoretical model for the analysis we chose to make the following
speci¯cations. We assume linear, °uctuating demand P(Q) = µ ¡ bQ. and derive the
set of available technologies, given by the pairs of annuities of investment cost on the one
hand and production cost on the other. For a given demand distribution, and for given
investment and production cost structure k(c), ¯rms investment choices can be calculated
as given in theorems 1 2 and 3. The resulting investment choices allow us to derive the price
distribution for all 8760 hours of the year and to compare to the observed price distribution.
The major purpose of such empirical analysis is to provide a practical illustration how
the theoretical results can be used in order to derive ¯rms investment decisions and result-
ing wholesale electricity prices for di®erent market structures. The Model parameters are
determined as follows:
Market demand: To construct °uctuating market demand, we depart from hourly mar-
ket prices (from the European Energy Exchange (EEX)27) and hourly quantities consumed
(from the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE)28) for the
year 2006. We chose the value of b in line with other studies on energy markets. Most
studies that estimate demand for electricity29 ¯nd short run elasticities between 0.1 and
0.5 and long run elasticities between 0.3 and 0.7.30 The relevant range of prices is around
P = 100 €/MWh and corresponding consumption is approximately Q = 50 GW. In our




29See, for example, Lijsen (2006) for an overview of recent contributions on that issue.
30E.g. Beenstock et al. (1999), Bjorner and Jensen (2002), Filippini Pachuari (2002), Booinekamp (2007),
and many others.











Figure 5: Fitting a Weibull distribution (® = 2, MLE for the parameter: b ¯ = 368:31) to
the frequency distribution of intercepts f(µ).
The computed intercepts µ for each of the 8760 of the year are sorted, their frequency-
distribution is reported in ¯gure 5. In order to satisfy the smoothness required to match
the theoretical framework we ¯t a Weibull distribution31 with parameter ® = 2.
The ¯tted distribution exhibits fatter tails than the distribution of observed intercepts.
Those fatter tails could be motivated by the uncertainty about levels of demand at the time
of investment additionally to the °uctuation of demand.
Production cost: The major component of variable production cost are fuel prices at the
plant and cost of CO2 emission allowances, which are determined by the price of allowances
(assumed to be 10 €/t CO2) and the emissions coe±cient of the di®erent technologies.
Production cost can then be computed based on the e±ciencies of each technology32. No











For ® = 2 condition (b) of lemma 5 is satis¯ed.
32See 2006 GTW Handbook or EWI and Prognos (2005).
25Nuclear Lignite Coal CCGT GT
E±ciency - 43:5% 47:0% 58:0% 37:5%
Fuel-prices at plant €/MWh - 3:0 7:6 19:8 19:8
Cost of CO2-Cert. €/MWh - 9:10 7:7 3:5 5:4
c Production Cost in €/MWh 5:0 18:3 25.7 38.1 58.7
Overnight Investment in €/kW 2011:3 1196:4 1073:7 550:0 250:0
Annual ¯xed cost in €/kWa 40:0 31:6 30.2 27.4 19.01
Free CO2 allocation in €/kWa 0 56:25 56:25 27:38 3:65
k Investment Cost in €/kWa 293:9 126:86 110.46 70.50 47.9
Table 1: Cost of Production c and Cost of Investment k.
information has been found for variable production cost of nuclear power plants,. it is
assumed to be given by 5=MWh. A proxy for ¯nal production cost of electricity for all
di®erent technologies in 2006 is reported in table 1.
Figure 6: Fitting the pairs of production cost and investment cost to the following hyper-
bolic function: k(c) = 635:2
c0:47 ¡ 34:5.
Investment Cost: Since we analyze investment incentives based solely on one year, we
break down investment cost to annuities.33 In order to take construction times into account
33The results will thus only yield a benchmark for current pro¯tability of investment. Provided, however,
that yearly demand is increasing over time (and that strategic timing of investment is not an issue) our
procedure should yield accurate predictions, even though once installed capacities cannot be removed the
26we consider investment for the years 1995/2000. We furthermore assume perfect foresight,
i.e. all cost components have been predicted accurately by the ¯rms at the time of their
investment decision. The relevant annuities are determined based on investment cost and
annual ¯xed cost of running the plant. These values are corrected by availability of each
technology, we take an average availability of 94%.34 Based on a ¯nancial horizon of 20
years and an interest rate of 10 % we can compute annuities of investment cost. Finally, the
free allotment of CO2 allowances granted to new power plants results in a de facto reduction
of the annuity by the net value of the allocated allowances. The resulting annual cost of
investment for each technology are reported in table 1. In order to illustrate our theoretical
¯ndings we need to specify a continuous technology set which associates investment cost k
to any level of production cost c. We do this by simply ¯tting a continuous function to the
pairs c and k in table 1. We choose a simple hyperbolic functional form: k(c) =
p2
cp1 + p3
(least square ¯t yields: k(c) = 635:2
c0:47 ¡ 34:5).
After solving for ¯rms investment choices (compare theorems 1 2 and 3.) we obtain
Industry investments for the scenarios analyzed. This is illustrated in ¯gure 7. Only the
case of strategic interaction is sensitive to the numbers of ¯rms, the graph illustrates the
case of 2 and 4 ¯rms. The graph illustrates that the presence of market power also has a
strong e®ect on ¯rms investment choices. Most interestingly we observe a strong incentive
for overinvestment in e±cient technologies, in the case of strategic interaction of 4 ¯rms.35
Up to a level of production cost of 25€/MWh ¯rms invest more than in the ¯rst best
scenario.36 As a main result we thus conclude that predicted investment for the German
market with four strategic ¯rms in base{load technologies (producing at marginal cost
below 25 €/MWh, such as nuclear and lignite plants) exceeds ¯rst best investment levels.
Strategic under{investment takes place exclusively in middle and peak load technologies
(such as gas, or oil-¯red plants). Finally from the predicted capacity levels we now compute
the price distribution over all 8760 hours of the year as illustrated in ¯gure 8. Figure 8
provides the observed price distribution (PReal), as well as the predicted price distributions
for the benchmark cases of perfect competition (PFB) and Monopoly (PM) and also for the
case of strategic interaction (PEQ;4, 4 ¯rm oligopoly and PEQ;2 duopoly). In order to make
subsequent year.
34Compare VGB Powertech (2006).
35The German market consists essentially of four large players. Two of them (RWE and E.on) have a
market share of 26 % each, while the two smaller ones (ENBW and Vattenfall) together cover 30 % of the
market each. Compare, e.g., Monopolkommission (2007).
36Remarkably, this is not the case for a hypothetic duopoly of ¯rms, nicely illustrating our theoretical
result of lemma 6.





































































the di®erences more visible, in the ¯gure we focus on prices in the interval [0;350]. We ¯nd
that for the parameter con¯guration we chose, observed prices are somewhere in between
the ¯rst best scenario and strategic interaction of ¯rms.
Notice that the relatively low level of observed prices (as compared to the strategic
scenario) may well be due to the fact that currently ¯rms have more capacity installed than
they would have chosen in a liberalized regime.37 Our theoretical analysis implies that the
current prices do not yield su±cient investment incentives to sustain the current investment
level. Strategic investment would a®ect the price distribution, as comparison of the curves
for the cases FB and EQ illustrates. We can conclude that there seems to be considerable
potential for the exercise of market power in the long run when taking ¯rms investment
decisions into account.
37In the pre-liberalization period, generators where subject to a rate of return regulation that imposed
excessive investment incentives.






































Figure 8: Distribution of market prices for perfect competition (PFB), monopoly (PM), and




In this article we analyze ¯rms investment incentives in liberalized electricity markets. Since
electricity is economically non storable, it is optimal for ¯rms to invest in a di®erentiated
portfolio of technologies in order to serve strongly °uctuating demand. In the absence
of strategic interaction, for a single ¯rm, optimal investment and pricing decisions have
been thoroughly analyzed in the so called peak load pricing literature. Those ¯ndings were
widely used to model investment decisions in electricity markets prior to liberalization,
when electricity was supplied by regulated monopolies.
Liberalization of electricity markets which started in the 1990's throughout Europe
has changed this picture dramatically. In many countries electricity generation has been
opened to competition and regulated monopolistic generators have been replaced by com-
peting ¯rms. All the results obtained in the peak load pricing literature, however, are not
applicable in case ¯rms do not behave perfectly competitively, but interact strategically
when making their investment decisions. Since electricity markets especially in Europe are
thought to be subject to the exercise of market power, however, the formerly used frame-
work of the peak load pricing literature now has only limited use when predicting ¯rms
29investment decisions in those markets.
It has been the aim of the present article to derive equilibrium investment choice in
liberalized electricity markets when ¯rms behave strategically. We have derived equilib-
rium investment and compared it to the benchmark cases of perfect competition (welfare
maximization), monopoly (pro¯t maximization) and the so called second best solution de-
rived in the peak load pricing literature. Interestingly, under imperfect competition ¯rms
have a strong incentive to invest into low marginal cost technologies in order to in°uence
their competitors' spot market outputs. We have been able to establish properties under
which this strategic e®ect is so intense that equilibrium investment in low marginal cost
technologies in oligopoly is even above the welfare optimal level.
We ¯nally have calibrated the theoretical framework to the problem of investment choice
in the German electricity market. As a main result we ¯nd that investment of strategic
¯rms in base{load technologies (producing at marginal cost below 25 €/MWh, such as
nuclear and lignite plants) exceeds ¯rst best investment levels. Strategic under{investment
takes place exclusively in middle{ and peak{load technologies (such as gas, or oil-¯red
plants). Our empirical results con¯rm that the framework established in the present article
provides a new and powerful tool in order to analyze investment behavior of strategic ¯rms
in electricity markets. It allows to assess the potential for the exercise of market power
in liberalized electricity markets in the long run, by taking ¯rms investment decisions into
account.
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32Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
Part (i): Since only technologies c 2 [c0;c00] are a®ected by that change, we just have to
apply the product rule of di®erentiation to the integrand of the second summand of (2)



















































Notice that the lower limits of integration µc
i of both summands clearly do depend on c,
however only the integrand of the ¯rst summand is function of c through the expression






















Part (ii): Notice that changing total capacity at ci leaves the pro¯ts from technologies c < ci
una®ected. The First derivative with respect to changing total capacity is thus just given














Proof of lemma 2
The second order conditions for the case of perfect competition can easily be veri¯ed:
First we observe that the cross partial derivative with respect to di®erent technologies
38Maybe mention the continuity of pro¯ts issue, so di®erentiation of the limits µc
i wrt dx does not play







= 0, for all [c1;c2] di®erent from [c0;c00]. Formally this is due to the fact
that the critical demand realization µc
FB for c 2 [c0;c00] as de¯ned by (5) does only depend
on X(c) for c 2 [c0;c00], but not on X(c) for c 2 [c1;c2]. Thus expression (6) is not a function






















dc < 0: (21)
This expression is negative since
µc
FB
dx(c0;c00) > 0, (compare expression (5)).











dF (µ) < 0: (22)
Notice: Since the integrand is continuous at µc
FB (equals zero), the derivative with respect
to this lower limit drops out according to Leibnitz rule.
Proof of lemma 3
According to lemma 2, the overall capacity bound X
¤
FB under perfect competition at tech-
















We rewrite the integrand of (ii) in terms of the critical demand realization µc¤
FB by making




¤ = µ ¡ B(X
¤
FB) ¡ c
¤ = µ ¡ µ
c¤
FB














denotes the critical demand realization where ¯rms start to become capacity
constrained and c¤ is the corresponding technology where ¯rms start to be capacity con-
strained. Denote by µcap(c) the locus of all points satisfying (ii) and remember that the
locus of all points satisfying (i) is denoted by µc¤
FB. In the following we show that these two
lines intersect exactly once whenever ¯rms are active on the market, i.e. (µ
¤
;c¤) exists and
is uniquely de¯ned by the above system:
• existence: If we have
R µ
c¤ µ¡c¤dF(µ) > k(c¤), then indeed the capacity condition (ii)
is solved for some µcap(c¤) > c¤, whereas condition (i) is solved by µc¤
FB = c¤. Thus
µcap(c) lies strictly above µc¤
FB at c¤. If on the other hand we consider some su±ciently
high cH, condition (i) will be solved at µ. Since we assume however k(c) > 0 for all
c (see assumption 2 (i)) condition (ii) can only be satis¯ed for µcap(cH) < µ (if not,
the LHS of (ii) would drop to zero). Thus µcap(c) lies strictly below µc¤
FB at cH, which
proves that at least one solution to the above system of two equations must exist.






Whenever µcap(c) intersects µc¤




) = 1. Since all interior
solutions satisfying condition (i) exhibit positive slope (i.e. µ¤
FB(c) > 1 we observe
that whenever the locus where condition (ii) is satis¯ed intersects the locus where (i)
is satis¯ed, then µcap(c) intersects necessarily from above (i.e. at (µ
¤
;c¤), the locus
µcap(c) is less steep than the locus µc¤
FB), which proves uniqueness.
Proof lemma 4
The argument with respect to the cross derivatives is analogous to the proof of lemma 2 in















dc < 0: (23)
This expression is negative since
µc
M
dx(c0;c00) > 0, ( compare expression (10)). For the second















X dF (µ) < 0: (24)
35Due to assumption 1(ii) the integrand is negative. Notice: Since the integrand of the ¯rst
order condition is continuous at µc
FB (equals zero), the derivative with respect to this lower
limit drops out according to Leibnitz rule.
Proof of Lemma 5 Preliminaries:
Properties of the Spot{market Equilibrium
In order to proof lemma 5, we need to precisely characterize the Cournot-spot market
equilibrium and it's reaction to changed investment of ¯rms. In section 5 we characterized
the spot market equilibrium somehow unusually without explicitly making use of marginal
cost functions Cj
q(q) but only in terms of the investments xj(c) made by each ¯rm. Only
throughout appendix 8 we will make use of the usual notation in terms of marginal cost
Cj
q(q), as already emphasized marginal cost Cj
q(q) are just the inverse of the investment





(i) Properties of the spot market equilibrium For ¯xed µ:
Derive the reaction of the spot market equilibrium for ¯xed values µ to a change in
investment level of ¯rm i at some speci¯c marginal cost c (denoted by dx(c)). The spot
market equilibrium for given marginal cost functions Cj
q(qj), for j = 1;:::;n is characterized
by the usual equilibrium conditions for an asymmetric Cournot-equilibrium:














Thus investment of the amount xc
i will allow ¯rm i to produce not at Ci
q(q) but at lower
marginal cost given by Ci
q(q ¡ xc
i) (where xc
i is small, with xc
i & 0). Di®erentiation of
expression (25) with respect to dx(c) yields:39



















dx(c), the reaction of spot market output of ¯rm i to it's change in the cost
function, and
dqj


























39From here on we drop the superscript EQ, in order to save notation. In what follows we always refer
to equilibrium outputs of stage 2.









Note that Rj corresponds to the share that ¯rm j has on the total change in Q. We can






















































´ 2 (¡1;0): (27)
(ii) Properties of the spot{market equilibrium at µc
EQ;i:
Now we derive the reaction of the spot market equilibrium at the critical demand real-
ization µc
EQ;i(xc
i) to a change in investment level of ¯rm i at some speci¯c marginal cost c0.
The critical µc































































dx(c) from equations j 6= i. We obtain by summing up and













































































































































dx(c) = Rj > 0 (30)
Finally we derive an important property of Rj(µc
EQ;i) which will be needed later in order






















We can thus conclude, that whenever (Cj
qqq ¸ 0) , (x00










EQ;i is de¯ned by the equation system given by (28).
























































































































































































































Later on we need to have an upper bound on q
EQ
i (µc
EQ;i). This is obtained as follows.
Notice in the linear case the spot market equilibrium (characterized in (28)) can also be
written as follows:
j : µc









j + posj = 0
i : µc




¡i ) ¡ c = 0
Notice if Cqqq(q) > 0, then posj ¸ 0.
Solve for q
EQ






























































39Proof of Lemma 5
Part (i): First order conditions
Throughout section 5 we already have shown how expressions (18) and (19) are derived
from the general ¯rst order conditions stated in lemma 1.


















































q(q) is the inverse of investment xj(c) of ¯rm j, for any q0 = xj(c0) the following























Part (ii): Second order conditions
In order to verify second order conditions we ¯rst analyze the cross partial deriva-







= 0, for all [c1;c2] di®erent from [c0;c00]. Formally this is due to the
fact that the critical demand realization µc
EQ for c 2 [c0;c00] as de¯ned by (16) and the
resulting Spot market equilibrium QEQ(µc
EQ) does only depend on xi(c) for c 2 [c0;c00], but
not on xi(c) for c 2 [c1;c2], where [c0;c00] an [c1;c2] are arbitrary non-overlapping intervals.
Thus expression (18) is not a function of X(c) for c 2 [c1;c2] and the cross derivative equals







We now focus on the second derivatives with respect to the same technologies, ¯rst we
focus on the interior case, i.e we need to show
d2¼i(x;qEQ)
d(x(c0;c00))
2 < 0. In order to prove concavity


































































For the case of linear demand (condition (a) of the lemma) and concave marginal cost
functions of the rivals, i.e. x00
j(c) < 0 (condition (b) of the lemma), we obtain
dR¦
j
dx(c) · 0 as
derived in appendix 8 expression (30). Thus whenever conditions (a) and (c) of lemma 5
are satis¯ed, this term is negative and can be omitted.










































































Notice that this is always satis¯ed for f0(µ) < 0. However, whenever f0(µ) > 0 we could




















In appendix 8 expression (33) we obtain an upper bound for q
EQ
i . By making use of














































41Finally under the assumption f00(µ) < 0, whenever f0(µ) > 0, as stated in lemma 5








EQ;i and thus (35) is satis¯ed. Concavity of pro¯ts for
the interior case can consequently be guaranteed, provided conditions (a), (b), and (c) as
speci¯ed in lemma 5 are satis¯ed.
We now show that also for the boundary case second derivatives are negative, i.e.
d2¼i(x;qEQ)
d(x(c0;c00))
2 < 0. In order to do so we need to di®erentiate expression (19) with respect































dF (µ) < 0 ?
Notice that according to Leibnitz rule we need to consider only the derivative of the inte-
grand, the derivative wrt to the lower border cancels out, since the integrand evaluated at
µc
EQ;i equals zero.










































2, again assumption (c) as stated in the lemma is crucial:





dx(ci) to changed cost function of ¯rm i. In the limit, whenever ¯rm j is capacity
constrained (marginal cost vertical) it will not react at all to changed cost functions of ¯rm





2 > 0. Furthermore due to assumption 1, also the ¯rst summand
is negative (both for the case of linear and nonlinear demand). Concavity of pro¯ts for the
boundary case can consequently be guaranteed, provided conditions (a), and (c) as speci¯ed
in lemma 5 are satis¯ed.
42Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of the theorem is in three parts. First we derive the symmetric equilibrium
candidate, second we show that deviation from that candidate is not pro¯table and third
we prove that an asymmetric equilibrium cannot exist.
Part I) Derive the Symmetric equilibrium candidate:
A symmetric equilibrium candidate needs to satisfy the ¯rst order conditions given in lemma
5. Since ¯rms can choose to invest at any level of marginal cost c ¸ 0, we directly consider

















0 Pqx = 0 (36)
For x(c) close to zero, the second summand drops out and we simply obtain41 1¡F(c)+kc(c).
Equilibrium investment can thus not be desirable whenever the ¯rst derivative is negative,
which is always the case for c small enough (compare assumption 2 (i)). Thus as in the
case of perfect competition and monopoly investment is pro¯table only whenever c > c¤,
where c¤ has been characterized in lemma 3.
Whenever c > c¤, the interior solution has to satisfy the following di®erential equation





























EQ = c + B(nx) + Pqx
For the linear case where Pqq = 0 and Pq = ¡b this yields expression (20) of theorem 3.
Solutions of the di®erential equation (37) are illustrated as dotted lines in ¯gure 9. The
locus of all pairs (x;c) where (37) equals 0 is denoted by x¤
0(c), all solutions of di®erential
equation (37) pass through x¤
0(c) with slope 0. x¤







¡ 1 ¡ kc(c) = 0
with µ
c
EQ = c + B(nx) + Pqx
Formally the solutions of the di®erential equations exhibit negative slope above the x¤
0(c) -
locus, since ¯rms cannot make negative investment, however, they ¯nd it optimal to make
no further investment above the x¤
0(c) - locus. In other words, for all pairs (x;c) below
41Notice for x = 0 we obtain µc
EQ = c, compare expression (17), since B(0) ¡ Pq ¤ 0 = 0.
43Figure 9: Derive the symmetric equilibrium candidate, solutions of di®erential equation
(37) and boundary condition given by point "B".
the locus x¤
0(c), ¯rms will never ¯nd it optimal to remain capacity constrained but will
always choose to slightly increase their investment (notice all optimal trajectories exhibit
x0(c) > 0) and for all pairs (x;c) above the locus x¤
0(c) ¯rms will not ¯nd it optimal to
increase investment, but will stop to invest choosing to be capacity constrained (which de
facto implies x0(c) = 0). We can conclude that in the candidate equilibrium the pair (x;c)
where ¯rms start to be capacity constrained necessarily must lie on the x¤
0(c) locus.
Finally the candidate solution must not only satisfy the interior optimality condition
given by expression (18) of lemma 5, but also the optimality condition for optimal overall
capacity choice given by expression (19) of lemma 5. For the symmetric case, expression
(19) yields all pairs (x;c) which satisfy the optimal total capacity choice condition. We
denote their locus by x¤









P(nx;µ) + Pqx ¡ cdF(µ) = 0
)
(38)
44The locus of the optimal capacity choice condition is illustrated in ¯gure 9. The candidate
equilibrium has to satisfy di®erential equation (37) and pass through the intersection of the
locus x¤
0(c) with the locus x¤
CAP(c) (point "B" in ¯gure 9) as boundary condition.
In order to show uniqueness of the symmetric candidate equilibrium it remains to show
that the boundary condition is indeed unique, i.e. that the intersection of the locus x¤
0(c)
with the locus x¤
CAP(c) is unique. In order to do so we observe that the integrand of
expression (38) can be rewritten in terms of the critical demand realization µc
EQ, by making
use of expression (17):
P(nx;µ) + Pqx ¡ c = µ ¡ (B(nx) ¡ Pq(nx)x + c) = µ ¡ µ
c
EQ
The pair (x¤;c¤) which has to lie both on the locus x0(c) and the locus xCAP(c) can




















denotes the critical demand realization
where ¯rms start to become capacity constrained and c¤ is the corresponding technology
where ¯rms start to be capacity constrained. Existence and uniqueness of (µ
¤
;c¤) have
already been established in lemma 3. We can conclude that theorem 3 characterizes a
unique symmetric equilibrium candidate.
Part II) Show that deviation from the candidate equilibrium is not pro¯table
We now show that deviation of ¯rm i = 1;:::;n is not pro¯table if all other ¯rms
stick to the candidate equilibrium x¤
EQ;¡i. By construction of the symmetric candidate
equilibrium the ¯rst order conditions of ¯rm i both for an interior change (expression (18)
of lemma 5) and for a change of total capacity are satis¯ed (expression (19) of lemma
5). Moreover whenever ¯rm i is capacity constrained (i.e. x0
EQ;i = 0, x¤
EQ(c) = x¤ for all
c ¸ c¤, "above point S in ¯gure 9") then the ¯rst order condition for an interior change
(expression (18) of lemma 5) is negative, which implies that ¯rm i indeed ¯nds it optimal
to be capacity constrained for all c ¸ c¤ (Remember, this is how the unique symmetric
equilibrium candidate has been determined in Part I) of the current proof).
In lemma 5 (ii) we furthermore show su±ciency of the ¯rst order conditions of ¯rm i.
That is, when considering the second derivative with respect to changing investment for a
45given interval of marginal cost of production [c0;c00] we show concavity. Furthermore, most
importantly, all cross derivatives with respect to changing investment at di®erent level of
production cost (i.e. the two disjunct intervals [c0;c00] and [c1;c2]) equal zero. This implies
that optimality of increasing or reducing investment for a given interval of marginal cost
of production [c0;c00] is independent of changes in investment made at any other level of
marginal cost of production, i.e. [c1;c2].
This is illustrated in ¯gure 10. Whenever cumulative investment xDEV b
i (c) is in the
Figure 10: Deviation from the symmetric equilibrium candidate is not pro¯table.
region below x¤
EQ;i(c) for some c 2 [c0;c00], then ¯rm i can increase it's pro¯ts by increasing
investment in c 2 [c0;c00]. Since cross derivatives equal zero this does not interfere with
changing investment for other levels of marginal cost of production. We can thus conclude
that ¯rm i will always reduce it's pro¯ts when deviating from the symmetric equilibrium
candidate x¤
EQ. This proves existence of the symmetric equilibrium.
Part III) Show that an asymmetric equilibrium cannot exist:
We ¯nally show that an asymmetric equilibrium of the investment market game cannot
46exist. The ¯rst order conditions for the optimal investment decision in an asymmetric





EQ;j) ¡ 1 ¡ kc(c)
f(µc
EQ;j)b2xj ¡ b(F(µc






EQ;i) ¡ 1 ¡ kc(c)
f(µc
EQ;i)b2xi ¡ b(F(µc
EQ;i) ¡ 1 ¡ kc(c))
(40)
The proof is in two parts:
(i) Take a potential equilibrium candidate x0 and denote by c0
i the technology where
¯rm i starts to have positive investment. Wlg sort ¯rms such that ¯rm 1 is the one




We ¯rst show now that x0 cannot be an equilibrium if c0
1 < c¤: Notice that x0
1(c) > 0
for all c > c0
1 can only be a solution if:




1) = 0 (41)
Since the above equation is solved by c¤ and since kcc(c) > f(c) for all c (see assump-
tion 2 (iii)) we necessarily have 1 ¡ F(0 + c0
1) + kc(c0
1) < 0, contradicting (41).
Since furthermore xi(c) cannot become negative, we can conclude that all (potentially
asymmetric) equilibrium candidates pass through (0;c¤).
(ii) We now derive the slopes of the solutions of the above equation system (given by
expressions (39) and (39)) at the point (0;c¤). Since the right hand sides of the
above equation system yield "0
0", the slopes can be determined by applying the rule
of l'Hopital, the result is given in expression (43), and we obtain x0
i(c¤) = x0
j(c¤).
Now suppose there exists an asymmetric equilibrium xi(c) and xj(c). As shown in part
(i), both necessarily pass through (0;c¤). Then for any c > c¤, such that xi(c) < xj(c)
, the equations (39) and (39) imply that xi(c)0 < xj(c)0. However this is inconsistent
with the above statement (i.e. xi(c) < xj(c)).
We can thus conclude that an asymmetric equilibrium cannot exist.
47Proof of Lemma 6
First determine x¤0
EQ(c¤): Since x¤
EQ(c¤) = 0 both numerator and denominator of (37) equal
to zero at c¤. In order to determine x¤0

































¡ 1 ¡ kc(c)
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Where according to expression (37), the critical demand realization µc














¡Pq(n + 1) ¡ Pqqnx¤
EQ
¢
+ 1. We can thus
replace µ¤0
EQ in (42) and then solve the resulting quadratic form for x¤0
EQ(c¤). This yields the




kcc(c¤) ¡ (n + 2)f(c¤) +
q
(kcc(c¤) ¡ (n + 2)f(c¤))
2 + 8f(c¤)(kcc(c¤) ¡ f(c¤))
¡Pq(0) f(c¤) 4
(43)
In order to prove the lemma we now compare x¤0
EQ(c¤) to x¤0
FB(c¤). Remember in section











¡Pq(0) f(c¤) 4 n
µ
kcc(c¤)(n ¡ 4) ¡ (n(n + 2) ¡ 4)f(c¤) + n
q
(kcc(c¤) ¡ (n + 2)f(c¤))
2 + 8f(c¤)(kcc(c¤) ¡ f(c¤))
¶
> 0 ?
, (kcc(c¤) ¡ f(c¤))
µ





Since by assumption 2 (iii) we have kcc(c¤) ¡ f(c¤) > 0, we observe over{investment
(with respect to ¯rst best investment) in e±cient production technologies if and only if
kcc(c¤) > 2f(c¤)n¡1
n¡2, which proves the lemma.
42Notice as c ! c¤, we obtain x¤
EQ ! 0 and µ
c
¤
EQ ! c¤, after di®erentiation these values can directly be
plugged in.
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